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The paper proposes an open architecture to support the 
creation of a synthetic environment devoted to simulate 
complex scenarios related to the protection of cyber-
physical systems. The proposed approach is based on 
applying the combination of interoperable simulation 
and serious games to develop a framework where 
different models, as well as real equipment, could 
interoperate based on High Level Architecture standard. 
By this approach, it becomes possible to create a 
federation reproducing a scenario including multiple 
physical and cyber layers interacting dynamically and 
reproducing complex situations. The authors propose an 
example of specific case study conceptually developed 
to apply this approach. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Today “Cyber” is an hot spot, as well as a buzz word, 
and there are many discussions about it; therefore 
despite the general considerations, the experienced 
along recent years confirm the impact of threats acting 
on the cyber layer and the escalation of attacks in this 
“space” that is constantly growing in terms of 
extension, impact, tactics and strategies (Wilhoit & 
Hara 2015; Page et al. 2017). Due to these reasons, the 
development of Cyber ranges as a synthetic 
environments devoted to address cyber defense is 
currently evolving quickly as a necessity (Pridmore et 
al. 2010; Winter 2012; Ferguson et al. 2014). In facts 
along last years the cyberspace impact on physical 
system exploded and the cyber attacks confirmed the 
need to develop new capabilities able to support the 
development of new systems and policies in this area 
(Cashell et al.2004; Kunder et al. 2010; Sgouras et al. 
2014). A major additional issue is represented by the 
Education and Training, another set of activities that 
require a framework where to conduct test and exercises 
(Pham et al. 2016; Törngren et al. 2017).  
In this sense a Cyber Range is expected to provide the 
opportunity to experience the use of tools and 
techniques able to improve the stability, security and 
performances of cyber physical systems. 
 
 
Fig.1 – Cyber Space Representation coupled with real 
layer within Simulation Team Synthetic Environment  
 
The Cyber Range concept is similar to that one of the 
shooting and kinetic ranges, in use by military force, 
that allows to train warfighters in using weapons and 
conduct operations. In similar way, the cyberwarfare 
actors and players are expected to use the Cyber Range 
for training as well as for development and testing of 
new solutions and tactics in order to ensure consistent 
operations and readiness for real fighting. From this 
point of view it is evident that the cyber warfare is 
evolving from simple attacks to become part of more 
evolved and comprehensive strategies based on the use 
of real “cyber weapons” that could compromise critical 
infrastructures, society policies and endanger human 
life (Chakhchoukh & Ishii 2015); to face these 
challenges there is a growing need of Cyber Ranges 
able to reproduce multiple layers that are closely 
interconnected as it happen in the real world (Bruzzone 
et al.2016). Due to theses reasons and considering the 
complexity of the proposed scenarios, the authors 
suggest the adoption of an open architecture able to 
integrate different components including specific 
models, meta-models, interoperable simulators as well 
as real equipment. A review of the literature shows that 
the integration of interoperable simulators, analytical 
models and real equipment have been also successfully 
used also in the physical space in sectors like Industry, 
Logistics, Healthcare. Examples of review articles and 
applications in different areas also including security 
issues can be found in (Michael et al., 2014; Zhou et al., 
2016; Longo, 2015; Longo 2012). 
 
2 STATE OF ART IN MODELLING CYBER 
 WARFARE & EXISTING CYBER RANGES 
It is evident since several years that the cyber warfare is 
a crucial element to simulate in order to support 
decision makers to face challenges posed by cyber 
warfare itself (Stytz & Banks 2012).  
Indeed, since the beginning of this decade, it has been 
proposed this concept as following: “a cyber range is a 
facility allowing a model of an IT system to run in a 
simulated environment to perform tests and 
measurements that are applicable to the real world” 
(Winter, 2012).  
Even statistics turn to be an useful “tool” for analyzing 
cyber attacks along those years; for instance a pretty 
interesting study presents a statistical framework for 
investigating cyber attack data and predicting them in 
term of attack rate with reasonable accuracy (Zhan, Z. 
et al. 2013). 
US DoD (United States Department of Defense) is 
deeply involved in cyber range investigation through 
the National Cyber Range (NCR) operated by the Test 
Resource Management Center (TRMC) and the project 
has been seen as a major event in this context (Pridmore 
et al. 2010). In facts the evolution of this program 
allowed to analyze the DoD PMs (program managers) 
necessities and to refine objectives: “Internet-like 
environment by employing a multitude of virtual 
machines and physical hardware” have to be created “to 
find the best approach for testing the cyberspace 
resiliency of the systems under development” in order 
to show how incorporating cyber security at early stage 
of the development life cycle “helps to avoid high cost 
integration” (Ferguson et al. 2014)  
A more recent definition of cyber range in training 
perspective says “Cyber-Range is a vehicle used to train 
in offensive and defensive Information Operations and 
Information Warfare” (Lawless et al. 2014) In this case 
it is presented a modular approach to the Cyber-Range 
Framework development, tailored for being adaptable 
and to meet current and future needs. 
Again, statistics play a key role: advanced forecasting 
technique such as Exponentially Weighted Moving 
Average (EWMA) are applied to investigate Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks (Olabelurin et al. 
2015) and it is proposed a methodology for reducing the 
number of alerts and false positive alarms. 
Typically, training in this context is very crucial for 
military personnel: an interesting work on NATO MSG-
117 activities (assessing which areas of Modeling and 
Simulation could contribute to cyber defense) and SISO 
standards summarizes the current position in this sense 
(Croom-Johnson, S., 2015).  
Obviously the personnel is a key factor in managing 
cyber security issues and social engineering should be 
properly addressed in this field (Granger 2001; Evans & 
Wallner 2005; Goodchild 2012). Indeed, despite a large 
numbers of certifications, applicants assessment is quite 
challenging. From this point of view gamefication is 
used to evaluate skills and technical abilities (Cherinka 
& Prezzama 2015). 
 
 
Fig.2 – Example of the Open Proposed Architecture  
 
End users are once more involved in the process, 
providing an ad hoc experience of cyber threats seems 
to be an helpful approach in the framework of Internet 
of Everything (IOE) for securing resilience of devices 
(Lawless et al. 2015). On the same track it is possible to 
apply Cyber Range to Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) in order to recover from a disaster affecting 
a large company; this approach had allowed to develop 
useful and realistic scenarios for disaster testing (Ali & 
Santos 2015; Kisekka & Baham 2015). 
Testing and training are again core elements of 
scientific research on cyber range: “Cyber Security 
Training Range, a simulation infrastructure where 
various scenarios can be recreated and tested, to educate 
Mission planners, Mission engineers and System 
administrators on the possible attacks at the different 
mission phases, shall be available as daily working 
asset.” (Mann & Zatti 2016).  
In this sense the use of proper modeling techniques to 
reproduce heterogeneous networks incorporating 
multiple entities to create a realistic cyber-physical 
scenario is fundamental (Bruzzone et al.2013). A large 
number of trainees performing training activities in 
specific environment that contains virtual machines, 
network topology, security-related content etc is quite 
challenging, a possible solution is the use of automatic 
generated cyber ranges for education and training based 
on specifications defined by the instructors (Pham et al 
2016; Bruzzone et al. 2016). DDoS are one of the most 
“effective” and “efficient” threat to deal with. Modeling 
is used to develop a model of normal user behavior with 
weighted fuzzy clustering (Zolotukhin et al.2016).  
Miming the real systems is another M&S application 
“mimetic environments, which mimic actual networks 
including personal computers, network assets, etc., are 
required for cyber range or malware analysis” (Yasuda, 
S. 2016; Yasuda et al. 2017). In facts decision makers 
face cyber attacks and military commanders (as 
decision makers themselves) need models able to 
improve awareness of threats development; from this 
point of view interoperability is a major issues as 
suggested by recent works from NATO MSG-117 
(Modelling and Simulation to Support Cyber Defence) 
that address, as anticipated, this aspect with special 
focus on standardization process (Croom-Johnson &  
Couretas 2016). It is important to outline that, from this 
point of view, time-cost reduction is always a goal to be 
reached while developing cyber range environments 
through avoidance of errors in its configuration 
(Damodaran & Tidmarsh 2016). Again, cyber range and 
test at low cost are heavily involved while analyzing 
threats of actual automated systems, such as SCADA 
(Supervisory control and data acquisition), along with 
related potential issues and criticalities (Hallaq et al. 
2016). Lately, research is being even more focused on 
education issues; for instance, in order to evaluate the 
success rate of cyber security students, especially while 
performing lab activities in their master classes, have 
been identified “metrics, like the number of IDS alerts, 
network sessions, or top destination IP addresses, …, 
indicators of success or failure for final grade” 
(Caliskan et al. 2017). This is expected to be helpful to 
manage the growing number of cyber security exercises 
and evaluate students across different institutions and 
academic years. 
 
3 SIMULACRA ARCHITECTURE 
SIMULACRA (Simulation Multi Layer Architecture for 
Cyber Range) is an open interoperable architecture 
based on HLA, designed by authors, that is allowing to 
combining different simulators, models and real 
systems in order to create a common synthetic 
environment. The approach is based on MS2G 
(Modeling, interoperable Simulation and Serious 
Games) paradigm and emphasize the importance to be 
able to combine together multi resolution models and to 
cover specific layers also by metamodels when more 
high fidelity solutions are not available or usable 
(Bruzzone et al.2014). In this case, the development 
process should be strongly integrated with VV&A 
(Verification, Validation and Accreditation) in order to 
guarantee a constant control of the simulation 
confidence bands and fidelity even in relaxed conditions 
devoted to investigate complex scenarios. 
Indeed the use of engagement techniques and 
immersive solutions common in Serious Games are 
considered fundamental due to their capability to 
provide an intuitive environment where the players 
could quickly understand the situation evolution and 
consequences of different operations in a scenario 
where the dimension and complexity is very hard. In 
facts, today, it could be interesting to evolve in this 
framework from the traditional man-in-the-loop 
approach, often based often in using hackers as players 
in the cyber defense training, to condition where it is 
applied the concept of man-on-the-loop supervising 
several assets and driving the operations at high level 
while low level actions are simulated by agents 
reproducing humans or artificial intelligences (Magrassi 
2013; Bruzzone et al.2015). In this sense the authors 
have already experienced several applications and 
developed solutions such as in the case of T-REX or 
JESSI, an agent driven stochastic simulation able to 
combine real and cyber components of a 
multidimensional space that include air, land, sea, 
underwater, space and cyberspace (Bruzzone et 
al.2016); this framework includes population, legacy 
and autonomous assets as well critical infrastructures to 
develop complex scenarios and it is able to cover social 
engineering, human behaviors and ICT network 
simulation (see figure 1). In this case it is proposed an 
architecture able to incorporate some of the capabilities 
addressed by T-REX with others provided by other 
federates as proposed in following figure 2. 
The proposed architecture deals to the use of specific 
objects within the Federation Object Model devoted to 
share the entities, attributes and interaction among the 
different simulators as proposed in figure 2. The objects 




The interactions in this case address issues such as: 
o Cyber Attack Action against a Target 
o Cyber Defensive Action on a Target 
o Routing for accessing a Cyber Service 
o Sending / Receiving Data from a Cyber Service 
Indeed it is important to define also performance 
indexes to evaluate the pending potential of cyber 
threats on physical systems; for instance respect an 
comprised information shared between A and B as 
proposed below: 
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G(t) Confidentiality Level on the G-th Path a t-time 
OLg
A
B(t) Global Confidentiality between A & B at t time. 
 
n  number of cyber nodes 
m  number of cyber links 
G   path among two cyber assets 
Path(A,B) Set including all alternative path between A and B at t time 
P(t,G,A,B) Probability to use G-th Path from A to B at t time 
Ln
C
i  Level of confidentiality of the i-th node 
Ll
C
j  Level of confidentiality of the j-th link 
 
The authors are currently working in adapting previous 
simulator for this purposes in order to extend their 
capabilities for addressing the specific new scenario 
proposed in the following. 
 
4 GRID ATTACK AND AUTOMATION 
One of the critical factors is the presence of nodes of 
different independent networks in the same geographic 
locations, for instance an office could have its own 
cable network with or without connection to the 
internet, while in the same time there are several mobile 
and WiFi networks covering the same area. Obviously, 
a bridge between them could be created; indeed this 
could happen occasionally or purposely, in the first 
case, for example the cause could an employee that 
could decide to use internet on a work place by 
activating a 3G modem or WiFi hotspot on a phone, 
connecting internal and external networks. In the second 
case, depending of available resources and intruder 
background and skills, there are different types of 
communication channels that could be established, 
starting from that ones mentioned before up to data 
transmission techniques which could allow to 
communicate even with air gaped devices, for example 
using PC speakers (Lazic & Aarabi 2006), noise of fan 
changing its rpm (Guri et al. 2016), transmitting RF 
(radio frequency) signals using memory data bus (Guri 
et al. 2015a) and even regulating thermal pattern of a 
PC (Guri et al. 2015b). Obviously all these techniques 
could be used not only separately, but also in 
combination to create mesh network of compromised 
systems, containing even air gaped devices in the case 
they are already infected. It is important to mention also 
that growing amount of IoT (Internet of Things) devices 
that introduce often insecure and outdated software, 
creating additional vulnerabilities and vectors of attack 
(Barcena & Wueest 2015). From the point of view of 
creating a cyber range, it is convenient to simulate 
several independent networks, not originally connected, 
as well as the establishment of occasional temporary or 
permanent link between them. In facts, for instance a 
possible targets of hackers is a very critical network: 
power grid (Adams, 2015); in this sense a very notable 
case of cyber blackout happened at the end of 2015 in 
Ukraine (Sullivan 2017). Obviously these facts create a 
lot of concerns about reliability of perspective smart 
electric grid; for example as consequence of an attack 
the power could be simply switched off as well as 
reprogrammed and invalid switching of electric devices 
could result in unsafe connections which may lead to 
fire in the target place (Mo et al. 2012).  
There are even some other vectors of attacks which 
have theoretical foundation, but, fortunately, limited 
experimental exploitation; for instance it's possible to 
'brick' or even explode the battery of an Apple's laptop 
flashing microcontroller's firmware (Miller 2011). So it 
is evident that several different kinds of interactions 
could affect physical and cyber systems and assets. 
5 SCENARIO & EXERCISE ON THE 
 SYNTHETIC ENVIRONMENT 
It is currently possible to define a testing scenario 
covering multiple layers including among the others: 
• ICT Infrastructures 
• Business Processes & Real Operations 
• Facilities  
• Entity & Units 
• Population & Users 
To create this reliable and useful scenario, it is proposed 
to define a specific case to be investigated in relation to 
an infrastructure providing business services. 
Obviously, it is useful to finalize the case in order to be 
realistic and easily extendable to a wide range of 
applications; in the paper the mission environment 
suggested is related to a College/University Department 
facing different kind of internal and external threats as 
well as malfunctions. 
In facts, a University Department represents a good 
example of a division within a larger organization. 
While the Department shares a different number of 
units, services and procedures coordinated centrally, it 
may decide to adopt or extend its own. For this reason, 
the Department depends also on internal administrative 
or technical employees who shall assist its Academic 
staff. Employees belong to internal units according to 
their functions, namely, if they work for accounting, 
research and teaching support or for the IT and 
technical field support.  
As an example of an internal administrative process, we 
could consider a “purchase request” concerning 
acquisition of material for a “research project”. The 
accounting staff of the Department applies internal 
arrangements on everything related to the tender 
specifications, the choice of potential suppliers; in this 
way the staff is supposed to record and verify all the 
support documentation. When the procurement process 
is finalized in terms of purchase request and winner 
selection, it is created and added the final order to the 
central accounting software, managed by the central 
University Informatics Centre. At the time of ordered 
goods arrival at the destination (the Department), it is 
conducted an acceptance check respect original 
requirements; in positive case, the administrative staff 
confirms the invoice receipt and authorize the payment 
through the accounting software.  
The internal IT staff also supports this process by 
making available different tools that they implement 
and manage locally. Among these tools, a file server 
allows the administrative staff to save and share, with 
the correct authorization rights, all the necessary 
documentation. Moreover, a calendar system helps in 
maintaining the deadlines of procurements processes 
and a ticketing system helps in keeping tracks of their 
status and of all the related communications. 
In our case, as it happen commonly, the Academic staff 
also access the file server and is enabled to use it to save 
all the data belonging to research and teaching activity. 
Considering the importance of mentioned services and 
of the saved data, the IT staff should also implement a 
reliable backup system and related procedures that 
could ensure business continuity in the event of 
problems. In order to keep these IT services active 
internally, the Department is expected to be equipped 
with a server room that is powered and equipped by air 
conditioning through a central power grid and a central 
HVAC (Heating, ventilation and air conditioning) 
system supporting all the buildings of the campus were 
is located the Department. In the proposed case, an 
external provider is currently responsible for 
maintenance of these facilities and it mainly operates 
using the Internet connection to access the control units 
of such installations. The Department has also a 
computer lab where students are able to follow lectures, 
conduct exercises and/or access Internet. A dedicated 
network segment of the infrastructure of the Department 
enables desktop computer and students’ laptops to 
access the campus network as well as Internet. 
In terms of threats, it is decided to focus on the 
following aspects: 
 Social Engineering: invoice with cryptolocker 
 Denial of Service (DoS): Students in the 
 Laboratories (voluntarily/accidentally) block access 
 to the campus network for the whole Department, 
so it turns impossible to access accounting 
program; this event could be coordinated in case of 
voluntary action with some other attack initiative 
carried out locally 
 Hacking of the Service Provider Network resulting 
 in enabling access to infrastructure services  
It is identified a set of possible alternative in terms of 
ICT configurations in order to check vulnerabilities and 
impacts, for instance between on-premises vs cloud 
solutions (So 2011). 
 
5.1 Social Engineering Attacks  
Social Engineering typically involve human factors; 
usually psychological manipulation is used to fool users 
or employees into handing over access privileges, 
confidential and/or sensitive data (Lord 2017). In facts, 
the social engineering techniques are often based on 
simple email or other kind of communication 
distributed over a wide number of users that devoted to 
cheat on them; sometime reference to general issues and 
urgency are used to solicit emotions in the potential 
victims that often react instinctively or superficially by 
clicking over malicious links and/or malicious files. In 
facts social engineering also use the weakness in the 
processes related to human elements (e.g. password 
recording or selection), in general it is evident that it is 
pretty challenging to defend large organizations and 
enterprises from these threats (Granger 2001; Evans & 
Wallner 2005; Goodchild 2012). 
As anticipated, often social engineering attacks are 
based on email specifically designed to look like a 
communication from a contact or a reliable organization 
(e.g. service messages, bank communication, request for 
information about some public work); in case the user 
clicks on these malicious attachments, usually, he 
install, unconsciously, some malware or ransomware 
(Abraham et al.2010); in facts, in general these email 
are pretty generic and include even errors and mistakes 
in order to discriminate smart and aware employers 
from superficial ones in order to maximize the 
penetration capability; however sometime the emails are 
tailored for specific users, just to look like originated 
from someone inside their organization or in their 
contact list. In facts often for most attackers is more 
easy to rely on social engineering respect to work hard 
in vulnerabilities of the Operating Systems (O.S.): in 
facts this approach address temporal weakness or 
superficial attitude of users and does not require much 
lower skills and efforts as well as not need to deal with 
the continuous advances and upgrades of the security 
systems (Mitnick 2001; Pettey & Goasduff 2010). 
Based on some statistics it is noted that technical 
weakness are addressed just by a small percentageof the 
cyber attacks while the remaining large majority uses 
social engineering methods; due to these reasons it is 
evident that the different O.S. does not guarantee too 
much respect these aspects (Saini et al. 2012). A very 
common social engineering attack adopts the phishing 
(statistically around 91% of data breaches) therefore 
currently ransomware is beginning to turning very 
popular in this area. In facts, it is not possible to define 
a single line of defense against social engineering, but 
education and training are important, in facts there are 
also solution to address specific typologies, such as 
ransomware. In general a good practice is to use reliable 
antivirus software, to make regular backups, to update 
software and to make sure that email attachments are 
scanned (especially compressed files and all document 
formats that support macros); it is also useful to disable 
the possibility to install unnecessary browser plugins 
and to teach personnel to pay attention before to click. It 
is evident that in our case study the Social Engineering 
represents a fundamental layer to be simulated. 
 
5.2 Denial of Services 
DoS attacks accomplish this by flooding the target with 
traffic, or sending them information that causes an 
accident. In facts the denial of Service (DoS) is very 
popular and aims to block a machine, or network, 
making it inaccessible to its users through saturation. 
These attack are usually focusing on denying the service 
for the legitimate users (employees, members, or 
account holders). DoS attack victims often are subjects 
used to manage web services for different organizations, 
private or public as well as to internal different 
divisions. Practically the DoS attacks block temporary 
the services and the server access, so in general they 
does not cause loss of information nor theft of sensible 
data, however the service deny could generate extended 
damages in terms of time delays and costs and could 
even be a vector to coordinate other cyber attacks (Peng 
et al. 2007; Gupta & Badve 2016). 
Most popular DoS methods deals with flood and crash 
services. In case of flood attacks the target system 
receives too much traffic for a server buffer, causing it 
to saturate, slow down and eventually stop. Examples of 
flood attacks include among the others: buffer overflow 
attacks, ICMP Flood, SYN flood; other DoS attacks 
simply exploit the technical vulnerabilities that cause a 
system, a server or target service blocking. A specific 
and popular alternative type of DoS attack is defined 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). In facts the 
DDoS attacks are carried out by multiple systems that 
conduct synchronized DoS attacks against a single 
target. DDoS main difference is that uses distributed 
resources to carry out the attack, instead of being 
originated by a single location. In general, the 
identification of attack source is pretty challenging 
considering that often it is carried out by a botnet: 
compromised systems that have been already corrupted 
and that serve as operative support for the attackers 
(Abu Rajab et al. 2006). Today there are several 
solutions devoted to defend against most traditional 
forms of DoS attacks, however DDoS are still one of 
the major threats for many organizations even if usually 
require strong capabilities by the attackers. Cyber 
offensive actions are currently very effective and 
limited capabilities are available for the defenders; in 
general it is not possible to share resources over the web 
being attack proof, therefore it is evident that training 
and experimentation allows to develop technological 
and procedural solutions as well as cyber defense tactics 
that could reduce the cyber vulnerability. Some of these 
methods are simple such as to install and maintain valid 
antivirus and keep them updated, or to install 
personal/centralized firewalls and configure it properly 
to limit outbound and inbound traffic to the desired 
traffic. In our case study the DoS is expected to be used 
at different levels: as a standalone attack by students for 
fun, as well as coordinated attack to block 
administration processes and controls. 
 
5.3 Hacking 
Hacking exploiting the gaps in the service providers 
network is a consolidated approach by hackers, 
therefore usually, these shortfalls are quickly solved 
directly by ISP technicians (Internet Service Providers). 
Therefore the web services based on MSPs (managed 
services provider) introduce specific vulnerabilities 
considering that these subjects are often responsible for 
remotely accessing and managing their ICT resources 
and user systems of their customers; these capability 
relies usually on direct and privileged accesses to the 
customer networks; the case of recent Teamviewer 
hacking is a very good example (Dunn 2017). In facts, 
when MSPs are based on cloud or hosting solutions 
they hold a very large amount of data, often sensitive 
and/or confidential. So by targeting just a single MSP 
an hacker could obtain several accesses to different 
networks and organizations. In many cases, often the 
most popular methodology to conduct the attack is 
based on phishing emails containing executable 
attachments. In facts it is common for the hacker to 
register spoofed domains in order to send emails from 
them pretending to belong to reliable organizations (e.g. 
academic organizations, charity, etc.). In case the 
malicious link is clicked the attachment delivers its 
payload to access to target network. In general, the 
stolen MSP credentials usually could provide 
administrator or domain administrator privileges to the 
hackers; in addition the attackers trades and shares often 
accesses and credentials to move through different MSP 
networks and their users. Major issues to defend MSP 
networks and services against attackers are based on 
several main principia such as to avoid that users share 
single account credential to access the services, two 
factor authentication, conducting continuous security 
tests, adopt endpoint security approach. MSP in our 
case represent a potential source for obtaining credential 
and accesses to the services for the attackers even if it is 
not hypothesized to organize a specific hacking of the 




The SIMULACRA architecture presented in this paper 
is inspired by the synthetic environments developed by 
Simulation Team for different applications and it is very 
promising to create an interoperable Cyber Range open 
to be integrated with different models. In facts the 
authors are currently finalizing the Academic 
Department Scenario in order to conduct dynamic 
experimentations and to test the interaction of IA with 
both University and High School Students during the 
simulation. The following step is to integrate some 
automation system to verify the interoperability of plant 
control within the proposed federation of simulators. 
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